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 The “Necessary Evil”: 
State and Non-State Sector Interactions in 
Cuba and Effects on Public Services 
 
Laura Lyons 




Five years after Lineamientos reforms were approved by the 2011 
Communist Party Congress, the effects are beginning to emerge. The 
development of the private or non-State sector in particular has begun to 
cause shifts in the economic, social, and political landscape as Cuba 
continues to adapt to and implement these changes. This paper explores the 
effects of the expansion of the non-State sector on the delivery of State-run 
public services, especially education, health care, and other social services. 
Four possible orientations between the State and non-State sector are 
explored in general and in the context of existing literature on Cuba, and 
are discussed in light of observations and interviews from a two-week 
academic field study in Cuba. Implications for public policy and leadership 
are discussed in the conclusion. 
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Introduction: Cuba’s Changing Context 
 
ince Fidel Castro handed over power to his brother and fellow 
revolutionary Raúl Castro in 2006, a series of liberalizing economic 
reforms has been implemented which has captured the attention of the world, 
and especially of Americans. The “Lineamientos,” or guidelines, put forward 
by the Communist Party in 2011, outlined the plan for the “New Cuban 
Economy” which included both economic and social policy reforms. Sagebien 
& Leenson summarize the Lineamientos as follows: 
 
The Lineamientos offer the managers of State industries greater discretion 
over the use of resources and increased decision-making power. They also 
enable the formation of “non-State enterprises” by self-employed people 
and by private cooperatives. Citizens can now legally buy and sell real estate 
and automobiles, and they can contract to provide services. Entrepreneurs 
and cooperatives can (at least in principle) access goods at wholesale 
prices...A mixed economy of private, cooperative, State, and foreign 
enterprise—all of it unfolding within a socialist framework—is taking 
shape.1 
 
Of the many changes introduced by the Lineamientos, the provisions 
outlining the development of the private (non-State)i sector have been some 
of the most intriguing and important for Cubans. The shift from a tightly 
centralized country with a planned economy to one containing elements of a 
market economy raises questions about the direction of political and social 
change in Cuba, and what wider implications such a shift may have. While 
the Lineamientos definitely do not represent a movement from a socialist to a 
capitalist ideology, the shift towards the development of non-State enterprises 
does have the potential to produce radical changes in Cuban economy and 
society. Such changes which will also, inevitably, redefine the nature of the 
public or State sector and the services it provides to Cubans. 
 
                                                          
i
 Generally, the term “public sector” describes those services that are owned and 
operated by the government or a government agency. “Private sector” refers to 
enterprises and organizations that are independently or collectively owned and 
operated. When speaking generally about these two sectors, I use the above terms. 
When speaking of these sectors in the Cuban context, however, I use the terms “State 
sector” and “non-State sector,” respectively. This is done to show the nature of the 
change- a move from a government controlled economy to one that offers greater 
opportunity for independent citizen participation and economic liberalization. It is 
consistent with previous scholarly literature on Cuba.  
S 
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How does the growing non-State sector bump up against the “rigid 
boundaries”2 of the State-dominated, centrally planned, Cuban economy? 
Now, six years after the introduction of the Lineamientos, how is the 
relationship between the State and non-State sector evolving? What impacts, 
if any, can be seen on the essential services that have been the source of Cuban 
pride and the triumph of the revolution for the past 59 years?  
 
This paper combines a synthesis of the current literature on public and 
private sector relationships with interview data conducted during a two-week 
field study in Cuba to explore the complex relationship between the State and 
non-State sectors during this time of economic transition. The current 
dynamic exhibits elements of both competition and cooperation between the 
two sectors. The non-State sector is both needed and resisted by Cubans and 
the Cuban State, and thus has come to be thought of by most Cubans as a 
“necessary evil,” simultaneously sustaining and threatening the current 
economic and social order. This paper lays the groundwork for further 
exploration of these dynamics, and considers wider implications for the 




State and Non-State Sector Development in Cuba 
 
In the 59 years since the Revolution, the effectiveness of some Cuban 
State institutions has been both stunning and confounding. Among the areas 
that will not be open to the new trend of privatization are education, health 
care, and social security administration.3 One can easily see why: Cuba’s 
progress in education and health care has been hailed by both Cubans and by 
the international community as some of the greatest achievements of the 
revolution. Cuba boasts one of the world’s highest rates of literacy (99.8%)4 
and access to education. It also boasts the highest rate of enrollment in tertiary 
education in Latin America (88%), and more than 800 municipal university 
branches in the 169 Cuban municipalities.5 Before the revolution, Cuba’s 
7,000 doctors were mostly employed in the private sector6; today, Cuba’s 
doctors have been mobilized into a world-class medical force that provides 
universal health care to its citizens, with more medical doctors per capita than 
almost any other country.7 Some would say that Cuba defies many 
development norms, since it “is a sheer development success even without 
having the structures and processes theoretically necessary for good 
governance.”8 The Cuban government has committed to continuing 
administration of these essential services, especially the social welfare 
Lyons: The “Necessary Evil”
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programs, even as other subsidies are being phased out or shifted over to the 
non-State sector.9 
 
However, not all State institutions have been so effective, nor has the 
quality of State services remained constant over the past 59 years since the 
revolution. State-sponsored food production (domestic agriculture) and 
housing are notable failures.10 During the first 10 years after the revolution, 
the government struggled to satisfy basic needs (food, health care, access to 
utilities, and consumption of food and beverage). After 1985, access to health 
care and education began to rise, yet consumption lagged.11 Even the delivery 
of education has wavered: in the early 1990s (coinciding with the collapse of 
the Soviet Union that ushered in the “special period” in Cuba), university 
enrollment dropped sharply because “the State could no longer guarantee jobs 
for university graduates.”12 Today, many wonder how, given Cuba’s moderate 
overall economic growth performance, the government can “maintain its 
commitment to basic needs and an equitable income distribution.”13 
 
The private sector, or, “the job-generating, income-producing arm”14, has 
been growing quickly since the Lineamientos were developed. According to 
a 2014 Cuban government report, 1,147,000 Cubans are now listed as working 
in the non-State sector, and of those, 483,400 are listed as “self-employed.”15  
Cubans can now apply for over 200 different personalized business licenses,16 
and more than 181 official jobs are no longer listed as being under government 
control, including shopkeeper, taxi driver, and construction worker. 
According to the above-mentioned report, these occupations are seeing some 





In order to reflect the expertise and first-hand experiences of Cubans and 
those living and working in Cuba, qualitative data from interviews were tested 
against descriptions of public-private sector dynamics as described in current 
literature. A synthesis of literature on public-private sector relationships in 
general and in the Cuban economy in particular established four potential 
scenarios for the interaction between the State and non-State sectors. 
Information in the form of personal and group interviews was then gathered 
from a two-week field study which took place from December 8-23, 2016 in 
Havana, Trinidad, Playa Girón, and las Terrazas, Cuba. The field study was 
part of a research excursion for graduate and undergraduate students arranged 
by the Hatfield School of Government at Portland State University. The theme 
of exploration for the field study was “Governance, Community, and 
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Contradiction.” During the field study, interviews with a variety of sources 
were arranged by both the educational exchange program coordinators as well 
as by the course instructor. Some sources have requested to remain 
anonymous, but all who are directly named here have consented to their names 
being used in this manner.  
 
 
Possible State and Non-State Sector Interactions 
 
The public and private sectors interact in a variety of ways, across many 
domains, and play different roles in different contexts. It has long been noted 
that there are fundamental differences between the two sectors, especially in 
terms of motivations18; while public agencies seek to serve the public good 
(and sometimes to earn public approval), private sector enterprises exist to 
make a profit, and thus differ greatly from State institutions, and especially 
from socialist State institutions. These differences are ideological as well as 
operational. Although there may be other forms of interaction, below are four 
possible ways that the developing non-State sector could interact with the 





Worldwide, one of the main ways in which public and private sectors can 
interact is through competition. Previously, the State had very little 
competition for customers of basic services, and the development of the non-
State sector has increased pressure for State enterprises to improve their 
services. Thus, when the State and non-State sectors compete in today’s Cuba, 
“State enterprises are facing the stark choice of becoming efficient (i.e. 
profitable) or closing their doors.”19 Although services like education and 
health care do not face direct non-State competition, “even these crowned 
jewels of the revolution would have to be subject to the State’s ability to 
pay”20—an ability which can be compromised if revenues from State 
enterprises that do directly compete with private businesses fall.  
 
Another possible arena of competition between the State and non-State 
sectors is that of workforce and labor resources. It is estimated that 20% of 
the labor force will be laid off in the coming years from state sector in the 
name of efficiency.21 As far back as 2014, economic reports show fewer 
workers entering some State sectors.22 The number or working-age Cubans 
employed in the non-State sector has more than tripled since the 1990s, and 
now stands at 30% of the workforce—at least 1-1.5 million working-age 
Lyons: The “Necessary Evil”
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Cubans—and rising.ii Private sector occupations typically offer higher 
wages23; an incentive that proves to be an incredibly powerful attractor, 
especially for younger Cubans. Indeed, “Upward mobility in Cuba from 1990-
2010 has been almost completely due to non-State sector growth.”24 How 
these State agencies will continue to attract and retain a qualified workforce 
in light of a more competitive job market will be an increasingly important 
question in the years to come.  
 
 
Transference of Techniques and/or Values 
 
It is the element of competition that gives rise to the private sector’s 
driving feature: innovation. In an effort to stay ahead of competitors, private 
enterprises are constantly looking for new ways to operate, produce, and 
serve. This not only leads to breakthrough ideas, but also to greater 
efficiency—both of which are also needed in the public sector. There is a long 
history of borrowing and adapting innovations, techniques, and theories 
between public, private, and nonprofit sectors. Even in the Cuban context, this 
kind of cross-sector transference is not totally unknown. As LeoGrande 
explains, “even before the collapse of European Communism, Raúl [Castro] 
pushed Cuba’s defense industries to adopt Western Management techniques 
to improve productivity.”25 The Lineamientos’ reference to “non-State 
management formulas” and “non-State modalities” seems to be an 
acknowledgement of this.26 
 
The discussion of public-private sector “borrowing” can be politically 
charged and heavily based in value assumptions. Proponents of New Public 
Management, for example, argue that integrating techniques and values from 
the private sector focused on efficiency, effectiveness, and innovation will 
improve the quality of service and promote accountability and stewardship of 
public resources. According to Catá Backer, much of the study of Cuban 
economic reform has focused on this “transition argument,” which holds that 
“ideological issues will evaporate once Cuba makes the jump from a Marxist-
Leninist planned economy model to a Western-oriented free market 
Democracy.”27 Because of their belief that a democratic governance and a 
free-market economy are mutually reinforcing, many international 
organizations like the World Bank, the United Nations Development Program 
                                                          
ii
 Unemployment can be considered very low to negligible in these numbers. Many 
Cubans claim that, because the State views work as a fundamental right, that there is 
no unemployment in Cuba- anyone who is of working age and ability who is not 
working is doing so by choice. 
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(UNDP), and the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) have made very strong efforts to “encourage the utilization of 
private sector approaches and non-governmental organizations in the delivery 
of public services.”28 
 
In many contexts, we see the public sector adapting management 
techniques, technological innovations, and marketing strategies from the 
private sector, a kind of positive transference which is thought to help the 
public sector to increase efficiency and productivity. In Cuba, such changes 
in operating behavior could have major impacts on the State sector, given its 
large size and wide reach in Cuban life. However, cross-sector transference 
need not necessarily be unidirectional; it is very possible that deeply 
entrenched State sector norms could influence how non-State enterprises 
operate. One Cuban-American scholar on the subject has concluded that the 
opportunities for corruption inherent in the current system could actually hurt 
the developing non-State sector.29  
 
 
Cooperation and Collaboration 
 
Another possible orientation of public sector towards the private sector is 
that the two may work in tandem, developing a symbiotic and mutually 
reinforcing relationship. In this scenario, the private sector would assist in 
carrying out what are currently strictly government functions, filling various 
consumer niches, and freeing up limited government resources and revenues 
to use elsewhere. Public-Private Partnerships and hybrid service delivery are 
pervasive in both developed and developing countries.30 This practice is so 
widespread, one researcher even found that in a study involving numerous 
countries, “there is no municipal government function that has not, in one 
community or another, been contracted-out to the private or non-profit 
sector.”31 In the U.S., for example, government-funded health and human 
services are more often delivered through non-profit organizations than 
through government agencies.32  
 
As the non-State sector develops in Cuba, the potential for cooperation 
and collaboration is very promising. New enterprises could change the nature 
of public service delivery through partnerships and co-delivery of services. In 
fact, the Lineamientos themselves outline the conditions of such partnerships:  
 
The business relations between companies, State-funded entities and non-
State organizations shall be formalized in economic contracts. The quality 
of the negotiation, drafting, execution and operation of these contracts, as 
well as the claims arising from their terms and the oversight of their 
Lyons: The “Necessary Evil”
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compliance shall be a requirement and an essential tool for economic 
management.33 
 
In this scenario, the non-State sector can actually aid the State sector in 
providing jobs for displaced workers as the State sector aims to improve 
overall efficiency and reduce its huge size. With the layoff of thousands of 
government employees in the name of efficiency,34 the non-State sector’s 
ability to absorb workers, and how the State manages this, will be crucial in 
coming years. The non-State sector may actually help the State maintain its 
commitment to work as a fundamental right for the Cuban people; harnessing 
the power of the non-State sector to accomplish such tasks would promote the 
creation of private jobs and spur economic development while unburdening 





A final scenario considered here is one in which the State uses its political 
and legislative powers to restrict or exploit the activities of the non-State 
sector. In a thorough analysis of the State’s role in current reforms in Cuba, 
Sánchez Egozcue and Cordoví35 assert that, “although the State acts as a 
regulator and intermediary by planning strategy and redistribution, tensions 
remain. They stem naturally from the differences in operating environment.” 
These tensions are a breeding ground for political turmoil. This phenomenon 
is certainly not specific to the Cuban situation. Rosenbaum36 notes that, 
“governments have increasingly relied upon regulation of the private sector 
as a vehicle to achieve particular public policy ends.”37 Although we usually 
focus on the “positive” changes associated with the growth of a private 
business sector, negative reactions by the State could be equally important. It 
should be noted, however, that even this pushback shows a reaction to the 
non-State sector, and in some small way represents a change in the way the 
State normally operates. 
 
 
Observations and Interviews from Field Study 
 
Data from observation and interviews conducted during the field study 
suggest that while the relationship between the State and developing non-State 
sector exhibit some degree of all of the scenarios mentioned above, the 
emerging trend is one of competition and cooperation. Evidence regarding 
each scenario is considered in turn below. 
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In Cuba, the non-State sector is known to deliver higher quality goods 
and services,38 and those who can afford to will likely choose to patronize 
these providers over the State sector alternatives whenever possible. In the 
areas where State and non-State enterprises overlap, several sources indicated 
that there is a noticeable degree of competition. In particular, State-run 
customer services such as restaurants and repairs have faced increased 
pressure from the higher quality and efficiency of services offered by 
emerging non-State sector providers. This inter-sector competition benefits 
the Cuban consumer, according to Camilo Condis, an employee of a small 
business in Havana. “Competition always benefits the consumer,” he said, 
adding that, “the producer evolves thanks to the consumer.”39 When asked 
why the Cuban government tolerates this sort of competition instead of simply 
using its power to crush private businesses, he said, “they never saw the 
potential of the private sector… they need us.”40  
 
Competition for labor resources is also evident. According to two experts 
on the Cuban economy, in the 1990s, 90% of the workforce was employed in 
the State sector.41 Today, the shifting trend shows 30% of the workforce 
employed in the non-State sector.42 Highly skilled and State-educated workers 
are choosing lower-skilled jobs in the private sector for, “greater 
independence and more money.”43 In the words of the EU Ambassador, 
Herman Portocarero, “you just don’t get good money in the public sector.”44 
 
University enrollment has actually declined in the last three years, 
according to Dr. Enrique Cabezas, a social scientist at a Cuban research 
institution.45 A young Havana local noted that many young Cubans are 
forgoing completion of their education because they do not want to be 
obligated to work in the State for the required three years after graduation, 
preferring instead to try their hand in the private sector.46 On the other hand, 
in the words of one Cuban academic, “people go into the State sector because 
they believe in what they are doing.”47 This rise of a distinct motivational base 
for public service, especially in light of the patriotism associated with the 
revolution, is therefore, a consequence of competition from the non-State 
sector.  
 
Therefore, in Cuba, as in many developing and transitioning countries, 
the public sector does not always attract the most talented workforce.48 While 
Cubans almost unanimously agree that the State provides high quality 
education, many do not pursue employment in their field of study in the State 
sector. Highly educated Cubans pursuing non-State jobs, or taking a second 
Lyons: The “Necessary Evil”
10                                                     THE NECESSARY EVIL                                     Vol. 3:1 
 
jobs in the non-State sector, particularly in the service sector, is a well-noted 
phenomenon.49  
 
This exodus of highly-skilled and highly-educated workers away from the 
State sector can be seen as a form of the “brain drain” which leaves the 
workforce struggling to recruit trained and talented employees. The waning 
appeal of State employment could, in turn, lead to the State as a “default” 
employer for workers who are not competitive enough to be hired into the 
non-State sector. The trend is indeed altering the composition of public sector 
employees- a phenomenon already noted in many countries with a flourishing 
private sector, not the least the United States. How these State agencies will 
continue to attract and retain a State workforce in light of competitive market 
forces will be an increasingly important question in the years to come. The 
government will, however, need to continue to offer incentives for workers to 
enter the public sector—for example, by increasing wages, which is already 
being attempted in some fields.50 
 
 
Transference of Techniques and/or Values 
 
As yet, this sort of transference of management or operation techniques 
from the non-State to State sector, or vice versa, was not very widely 
practiced, according to most of the sources interviewed in Cuba. This is likely 
due to the fledgling nature of the non-State sector (which has yet to develop 
to the extent that established norms and practices have been standardized and 
shared even amongst other non-State organizations) and the lack of a 
standardized system for business education. This also may be attributable to 
the strong ideological pushback to the “transition argument” mentioned 
above, since many Cubans do not want to see changes to some of their most 
beloved State-run services, especially health care and education.  
 
The Cuban education system, however, is one place where we can see the 
initial inklings of a government entity experiencing pressure to alter its 
methodologies in response to these economic changes. In response to 
“frustrations with the education system,”51 universities have been developing 
some programs to train students for the skills needed for employment in the 
private sector. For example, business, entrepreneurship, and management are 
all fields of study that have yet to be introduced to the Cuban education 
system. According to one source, the Federaction de Mujeres Cubanas, a non-
State group, has lobbied the government to provide such training for women.52 
Some State-initiated organizations, including the Federation of Cuban 
Workers (the country’s central labor union) and some groups within the 
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university communities themselves, are also pressing the government to 
develop education that is more relevant to the growing non-State sector.  
 
The emergence of non-State sector leadership also creates the potential 
for a transference of non-State sector values, as these new leaders and 
associated interest groups become an increasingly powerful voice in the 
Cuban public and political sphere. Currently, this voice is small but growing 
and, so far, “positive.”53 When the non-State sector has matured sufficiently 
to articulate its own needs and interests, we can likely expect leaders to 
emerge who will advocate on their behalf and further engage with the political 
process.54 As Mr. Condis explained, currently, local and community-based 
businesses have no formal lobbying power, even when it comes to the 
allocation of their tax dollars. “No matter how much you pay in taxes,” he 
said, “and no matter how many problems you have, you don’t have any power 
to lobby and get them fixed.”55 As the non-State sector continues to provide 
much needed jobs and capital for Cuban citizens, this voice may become 
louder. This is especially important given the growing number of “socially-
minded businesses,”56 which put community concerns at the core of their 
mission. The crossover of leaders from private business to public politics, 
bringing ideas and techniques with them, can be observed in many countries 
and communities around the world, and is a trend that may continue to evolve 





Multiple Cubans that I interviewed expressed the need for the State sector 
to turn over or contract out non-essential functions to private sector 
enterprises.57 58 One Cuban academic illustrated this point by offering the 
example of canteens in State-run facilities; “the State should not be wasting 
its resources on that,” she said.59 She suggested that the State should instead 
turn this function over to a privately or cooperatively owned organization that 
can provide the service more efficiently and with better quality service. As an 
example of the greater efficiency in completion of public projects, she offered 
the case of a building renovation on the University of Havana campus. One 
side of the building was renovated by a State-run company and the other side 
was renovated by a private company. Seeing the two outcomes so clearly 
compared was very telling; the State-run job took much longer, and the final 
result was of a much lower quality. However, according to one Cuban 
economist, the practice of public-private partnerships has not been very 
widely implemented as yet.60  
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Contracting out, privatization, or partnering can free up resources for the 
State to use towards safeguarding and reinforcing the public institutions that 
Cubans value, such as education and health care, which are currently 
struggling as the government tries to maintain its massive scope with limited 
resources. According to Dr. Enrique Cabezas, social spending in general has 
actually decreased in the past few years, although it is still very high.61 For 
example, the normal amount of time for Cubans to be in the higher education 
system has decreased from five years to four years in an effort to reduce 
government spending on education. According to one scholar of Cuba, “the 
government no longer has the capacity for food or health care.”62 According 
to Dr. Carlos Lopez, a Havana-based physician, 25% of the country’s GDP is 
spent on maintaining its health care system.63 The emergence of more non-
State organizations has begun to outline a pathway for assuming some 
functions currently played by the State, which will free the State to focus on 
these essential services. Those with a “social mission,” especially, can 
actually bolster the efforts of State-run social services and play a role in 
community development. If combined with the implementation of an updated 
tax structure and strong tax code enforcement, the government may actually 
be able to increase the amount of revenue that the State can spend on essential 
social services as people gain more independent wealth. 
 
The idea that the non-State sector can assist maintenance of core Cuban 
commitments or values is also sometimes echoed in the discussion of job 
market changes. The State has struggled to maintain employment 
opportunities for such a large workforce; with the number of ministries 
reduced by at least 27% in the past five years, and the number of State-run 
companies cut by 34%64, the State has been forced to turn to the non-State 
sector to continue to provide jobs for all Cubans. One point in the 
Lineamientos specifically calls for the “restructure [of] employment and 
wages, with consideration given to non-State management formulas where 
desirable, with a view to eliminating bloated payrolls in all the economic 
sectors and making sure that labor occupation becomes the main source of 
income for the individual.”65 Again, the rhetoric of the non-State sector as a 
“necessary evil” comes into play, and many Cubans feel that one of the 
reasons for the provisions of the Lineamientos is to maintain commitment to 
the belief in work as a fundamental right for Cuban citizens. While the non-
State sector may represent strong competition for labor resources (as 
discussed above), it also represents a huge support to the state by helping 
maintaining the salience of current values and ideologies. This kind of 
mentality gives rise to the idea of a “Solidarity Economy,”66 in which the State 
and non-State sectors act as mutually reinforcing and supporting, rather than 
being locked in competition. 
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Three Cuban sources mentioned that since the death of Fidel Castro there 
has been an ideological retrenchment by the State in an effort to prove that the 
disappearance of such a strong figure does not constitute a moment of radical 
societal change.67 This retrenchment has caused some tensions (some even 
describe it as “hostility”68) towards the non-State sector as the State clings 
tightly to its socialist framework. One U.S. Foreign Service Officer 
characterized this as a “crackdown” on private businesses, a limiting of private 
licensing, and a strengthening of already overly-strict regulations on the non-
State sector in general.69 To some, this appears to be a symptom of the 
resistance to competition by private enterprises and a general distrust of 
private ownership and the development of independent wealth.  
 
Mr. Condis, an employee of a small private business, did confirm that 
there are serious difficulties in accessing supplies and inputs, and that the State 
limits non-State businesses’ access to wholesale markets.70 This unfortunate 
difficulty not only restricts profitability, it also encourages the persistence of 
the black market and encourages what one source calls, “a culture of 
stealing.”71 Mr. Condis also noted that import taxes are incredibly high for the 
products that many small businesses have to get from overseas suppliers.72 
Imposing barriers of this kind may be intended to curtail the rapid growth of 
the non-State sector.  
 
In addition, there are still areas which are strictly State-controlled and will 
not be open to privatization any time soon. According to a U.S. Diplomat at 
the U.S. Embassy in Havana, “all heavy industry will remain in State hands.”73 
Again, as mentioned, there are no plans for private interests to enter health 
care, education, or senior care. In one sense this can be seen as State protection 
of these industries. However, it is important to note that, in general, there is a 
strong sentiment among Cubans that there should not be significant changes 
to the fundamental nature of these core public services administered by the 
State; Cubans highly value their access to these State services and do not want 
to see it turned over to private interests. In the words of one Cuban academic, 
“We have some political problems in Cuba. We need to make some changes 
to the economic system. But there are some things we have from the 
revolution, education, health care, and senior care, which we are very proud 
of and that have been very good for us. We don’t want to lose those things.”74 
This attitude may act as a sort of popularly-imposed restriction on non-State 
intervention in some State-run services. 
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The Cuban government is not passing legislation that explicitly restricts 
the non-State sector; they were, in fact, the creator of the Lineamientos that 
allowed for its recent emergence. However, the State is also not doing 
anything to explicitly offer incentives or manage its development either. This 
lack of institutional support does seem to hamper the growth and cause it to 
evolve in a “twisted, deformed way.”75 Many small businesses get their 
startup capital from remittances,76 which is both inefficient and unfairly 
skewed towards those with relatives in foreign countries. Correcting this 
would cause a major shift in the paradigm of the Cuban State sector: State 
employees and State agencies would be concerned with regulating, and 
monitoring, and managing relationships with external entities, rather than 
simply self-maintenance. This would indeed change the nature of the Public 
Sector and the Administration of public services in Cuba.  
 
 
Conclusions and Implications 
 
Seven years have passed since the introduction of the Lineamientos, and 
the relationship between the State and non-State sectors in Cuba is dynamic 
and still taking shape. Many Cuban sources that I interviewed felt that 
development of the non-State sector spurred by the Lineamientos reforms 
have been small, but important, and suggested that it is too soon to fully tell 
how the delivery of State sector services has changed in response to non-State 
sector development. Changes to the Cuban economy are by no means 
complete and have not yet fully reached the extent outlined in the 
Lineamientos reforms. Yet the changes underway in Cuba offer a rare and 
exciting opportunity to study the initial formation of the relationship between 
the Public and Private sector and shows how this relationship can influence 
the delivery of public services. Generally speaking, the current thinking is that 
“there is room in the economic reforms for a boom in private businesses… 
together with a continuation of ‘State-funded entities.’”77 Indeed, the Cuban 
Communist Party must believe this to some extent, as it has produced the 
legislation to support the expansion of the non-State sector. The Lineamientos 
themselves state that, “the economic policy is based on the concept that 
socialism, rather than egalitarianism, means equal rights and opportunities for 
all citizens,”78 which may indicate a shift in thinking about the nature of the 
State as an institution and the role of the State in Cuban public life.  
 
Currently, some degree of all four of the State/non-State orientations 
mentioned above can be seen in Cuba, but the relationship can be most 
accurately described as simultaneously competitive and mutually 
supportive—a “necessary evil,” as the Cuban adage goes. As the non-State 
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sector continues to expand and play a larger role in Cuba, the State sector will 
need to undergo a reformation and a redefinition. As it will no longer be the 
sole employer and the sole supplier of products and services, the State sector 
will take on a different function and will occupy a different space in Cuban 
society. While the primary and essential State-administered services, 
especially education and health care, will remain totally under the control of 
the State, there will inevitably be changes in the way these services are 
administered as a consequence of changes to the nature of public work in 
general and as the role of the State shifts. Health care, for example, may find 
that they will need to be responsive to a new set of social conditions that 
produce different kinds of doctors, as well as different kinds of diseases. 
Education, in particular, will need to adapt and respond to the needs of a 
drastically changing workforce. Public works and infrastructure may find 
itself trying to keep up with the expanding demands of private companies. 
Whatever the task, State-run services will find themselves under a new set of 
operating procedures as the composition, function, and the management of the 
State sector are shaped by the changes underway. 
 
The State will need to take on new functions as well. Creating and 
enforcing regulations regarding private sector activities and creating 
relationships with external entities will be at the top of this list. Creating 
public-private partnerships and incentivizing collaboration and non-State 
sector growth may also be new tasks for the State. To fully harness the power 
of this new economic dynamism, there will need to be an effective, fair, and 
enforceable tax structure. If it is to stop growing in a “twisted, deformed way,” 
better regulation, policy, and management is needed to make sure the growth 
is healthy and keeps the Lineamientos’ promise that “no one will be left 
unprotected.”79 
 
To accomplish all of this, Cuba will need to redefine the role of the State 
sector and distinguish it from other forms of employment by instituting a 
system of education and training for public managers, public administrators, 
and public employees in general. Currently, Cuba offers no training for public 
managers or public employees.80 Given that until the 1990s 90% of Cuban 
workers were employed by the State, it hardly seemed necessary to articulate 
the specific values of public service, as public service was the default. But, in 
light of the Lineamientos, the changing relationship between the State and 
non-State sectors, and the differences inherent in their aims and methods, 
education for public servants is needed now more than ever. With it, Cuba 
will be on the way towards the future it desires: a socialist system that provides 
free, fundamental services to all of its citizens, and a healthy, growing 
economy. 
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